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Issues of global justice and trade are usually dealt with in terms of what
a just system of trade is like and what the distribution of income,
opportunities, or welfare ought to be. But the question I address and
explore is what a legitimate way of making decisions in the international
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realm is. This issue has arisen acutely in the case of the formation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international institutions. In
particular, many have complained that developed countries engaged in
hard bargaining with developing countries in the conferences that led up
to the formation of the WTO, thereby engaging in unfair and undemocratic
methods for reaching agreements between developing and developed
societies.1 They have complained that these methods have damaged the
legitimacy of the WTO.2 I want to try to understand the nature of this
complaint by attempting to elaborate and defend some basic principles of fair
negotiation.
In this Article, I will lay out a conception of legitimacy in international
institutions. The basic framework from which I proceed is morally
cosmopolitan and democratic. Therefore, the conception of legitimacy
will include an egalitarian method for making decisions. The main purpose
here will be to explore the shape of this egalitarian method and what it
would mean for the case of interstate negotiation. This has proven to be
a hard nut to crack so the results of this paper will be exploratory and will not
issue in a complete account, but rather in a set of observations and partial
principles about what a just method of decision might be. The account is
somewhat fragmentary and it does not give much in the way of guidance
as to how to implement the principles in actual rules for collective
decision-making.
First, I lay out a conception of legitimacy for the international system
that is broadly cosmopolitan and democratic, though it attempts to start
with the idea of state consent. The basic project here is to explore how
the process of state consent, which is after all the most important source
of legal legitimacy in the international system, must be qualified and
modified in order for it to satisfy some basic democratic and cosmopolitan
principles. I defend the centrality of state consent and consensualism
generally against various majoritarian approaches to international collective
decision-making. I then set forth some principles for evaluating the fairness
of individual agreement making. From there I attempt to see how far this
idea can be extended to interstate negotiation. I point out the insights and
limits of this extension. I then discuss the formation of the WTO,
highlighting some of the difficulties of legitimacy and then articulate
some basic power apportionment principles for international negotiation.
This account is still incomplete and does not yet shed light on how to apply
1. See Thomas Christiano, The Legitimacy of International Institutions, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 380, 386 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
2. Amrita Narlikar, Law and Legitimacy: The World Trade Organization, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 294, 294–302 (David Armstrong ed.,
2009).
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the principles so as to construct collective decision-making mechanisms for
international treaty making.
I. LEGITIMACY
We need a preliminary account of legitimacy in the international system
to work with. The account of legitimacy that plays a central role in
international law is the idea that states are obligated to comply with
international law in the normal case only when they have consented to it.3
There are, of course, important exceptions to this having to do with
customary international law and general principles of international law.
States inherit their obligations under customary international law, though
they can change it in concert with other states. Moreover, there are some
elements of customary international law that cannot be changed such as
jus cogens norms.4 Nevertheless, state consent plays the main role in the
formation of international law and it is seen as the main ground of
legitimacy.
II. THE IDEA OF LEGITIMACY
I will say that a process of decision-making is legitimate, morally
speaking, when it can impose content-independent moral duties to comply
with the decisions on those who are directed by the decisions. Contentindependent duties are duties an agent acquires by virtue of the source of
the duties and not the content of the duties. I have a duty to meet you for
lunch on a certain day at a certain place, which I have promised to do,
because I promised to do it and not because I have any prior duty to have
lunch with you. To be sure, it is possible to have a content-independent
duty to do what I have promised in addition to a content-dependent duty.
The content independence of the duty does not preclude there being other
content-dependent duties to do the thing that I promised.
In the case of a legitimate decision-making process, such as a process
of treaty making, the legitimacy of the process implies that the decisions
create content-independent duties in the subjects of the decision-making.5

3. Christiano, supra note 1, at 381.
4. Id.
5. Thomas Christiano, Climate Change and State Consent, in CLIMATE CHANGE
AND JUSTICE 17 (Jeremy Moss ed., 2015).
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They have duties to do what they are directed to do because they have
been directed by the decision-making process.
The basis of the demand for legitimate authority arises when common
action among parties is necessary and when there is disagreement among
the parties as to how to structure the common action. The common action
may be morally necessary as when some group must pursue morally
mandatory aims. It may be morally needed because individuals within the
group are imposing costs on others and the group needs some way to
determine the extent to which this is permissible and the extent to which
the imposition of costs ought to be prevented or limited, or when
compensation is owed the victims from the benefits gained by the
perpetrators. Alternatively, common action may be necessary to pursue
the interests of the members, but there are controversial issues about how
to divide the costs and benefits of the common action. The common
action for public purposes will often involve imposition of costs and
burdens on persons.
There are a number of important kinds of controversy that legitimate
institutions are supposed to resolve. They need to resolve disagreement
on the best interpretation of morally mandatory aims, such as the
alleviation of severe global poverty.6 They need to decide how to achieve
the mandatory aims. They resolve disagreement on the proper distribution
of benefits and burdens of common action. The point of legitimate
institutions is that they provide a morally satisfactory way to resolve
disagreement and conflict among different agents when there is a need for
common action. They impose costs and benefits usually by imposing
rights, duties, and liabilities on the relevant parties. Sometimes legitimate
authorities grant permissions to agents to impose costs when normally
these agents are not permitted to do so.7 This converts the imposition of
costs into rightful action even when a controversial action is chosen and
it implies that sometimes legitimate decision-making processes will give
reasons for complying with the decisions even when the decisions are
themselves problematic.
There are various grounds for attributing legitimacy to institutions. One
ground is that the institution is reasonably effective at bringing about
morally desirable action and the compliance of subjects with its directives
are essential to that effectiveness. This is a results-based ground of
legitimacy. The two classical bases of legitimacy are democratic legitimacy
6. Christiano, supra note 1, at 388.
7. As the Security Council purports to do when it authorizes humanitarian
intervention or as the Dispute Settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization
does when it permits states to impose trade restrictions on other states that have been found
in violation of their trade commitments. Christiano, supra note 5, at 6 n.11.
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and consent-based legitimacy.8 In my view, democratic decision-making
is the gold standard for the legitimacy of states. The legitimacy of
international institutions can be seen as a consequence of consent by
representative states, or so I shall argue.
III. STATE CONSENT
Here is a brief defense of a kind of modified state consent account of
the legitimacy of international law. It makes sense, even from the standpoint
of a cosmopolitan and broadly democratic conception of legitimacy, to
start with state consent. I start with a brief account of why state consent
is a plausible necessary condition of democratically legitimate international
law and then I will articulate some modifications of such a view that
accommodate cosmopolitan and democratic concerns and that also
accommodate recent developments in international administrative law
that seem to go against the idea that state consent is central.
The main reason why state consent is the principal basis of the moral
legitimacy of international law is that the state remains, by far, the most
important institutional mechanism for making large-scale political entities
directly accountable to people.9 Other supranational political arrangements
may one day have this kind of accountability, but now and for the mediumterm future, they will continue to be quite unaccountable directly to ordinary
persons. The only accountability they have to persons is through states.
To be sure, the thin international civil society that exists in international
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) does help with this accountability.
But this only plays an enabling role in assuring accountability of international
law to persons. Decision power is invested in states; they are the mechanisms
ultimately responsible for accountability. Now, accountability to persons
is one of the common principles shared by consent and democratic
conceptions of legitimacy. They both assert the centrality of the idea that
persons have some kind of equal voice in the process of the exercise of
legitimate authority.10 Hence, if there is to be any legitimacy at all in
8. Christiano, supra note 1, at 382.
9. See Thomas Christiano, Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International
Institutions?, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 69, 70
(Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 2012) (“[L]egitimacy is possible for international institutions in
a world where states are the main players and the main vehicles of accountability of
political power to persons.”).
10. I develop the underlying theory behind democratic legitimacy in THOMAS
CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS
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international institutions that is grounded in the right of persons to have a
say in the collective arrangements they live under, state consent will have
to play a central role.
In addition, consent can create content-independent duties on the part
of the consenter.11 And it creates content-independent duties to all the
other parties to whom consent is given.12 In the case of multilateral treaties,
the consent of a state creates duties to all the other states in the treaty. It
is a clear and public method of creating these duties. The basic ground of
the consent requirement is that it protects the fundamental interests of the
prospective consenter. It gives the consenter a voice in the arrangement
that regulates its behavior and thus enables the consenter to pursue its aims
and its interests in the process of cooperating with others. From these
observations, if our concern is to construct institutions that advance and
protect the interests of human beings generally, our best bet remains state
consent.
IV. STATE CONSENT DEMOCRATIZED
We need to make at least four modifications to the traditional doctrine
of state consent to make it live up to the idea that it is a conception of
legitimacy grounded in the interests of persons in an equal voice in their
shared institutional framework. The first two I will mention only for
completeness but I will put aside in the rest of this paper. First, the states
that consent must be highly representative of the people in the state. The
motivation for state consent is the accountability of states to people.13 The
full realization of this idea involves the consent of reasonably democratic
states. In this way, individuals participate in the making of international
law through participating in the determination of the positions of the state
that is negotiating the law. This way, the idea that individuals are bound
by international law, directly or indirectly, can be vindicated.
The second modification needed is that we must make room for the role
of expertise in the making of international law. What is known as global
administrative law14 in the making of international law has some
independence from states, though ultimately they are responsible for it

46–130, 231–59 (2008), and the importance of consent in Thomas Christiano, Equality,
Fairness, and Agreements, 44 J. SOC. PHIL. 370, 379 (2013) (arguing that consent is not a
suitable basis for the legitimacy of states, though it can provide a basis of contentindependent reasons generated by agreements among persons).
11. Christiano, supra note 1, at 385.
12. Id. at 382.
13. Christiano, supra note 5, at 7.
14. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 25–26 (2005).
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and bound by it. I think that this can be legitimated from within the idea
of state consent in much the same way that expertise in democracy can be
accorded a legitimate role in the making of law. It does not need to be
directly accountable to persons, but it must be constrained so that it
genuinely and effectively pursues the aims and realizes the principles of
the principal parties.15
The third modification, which will be the principal focus here, is that
the process of negotiation by which treaties are created must be a fair
process of negotiation in which the parties are treated as equals in the
process. Obviously, coercion and fraud are normally ruled out by this
standard, but so are the kinds of pressure that result from very different
levels of economic and military power. Without some way to temper the
effects of differences in economic and military power, the process that
produces treaties cannot but be seen as greatly favoring the interests of the
more powerful parties.
V. THE MORALLY MANDATORY AIMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AND THE LIMITS OF STATE CONSENT
The fourth modification sets the framework within which the discussion
of this paper will take place. The global community is currently facing
some fundamental moral challenges, which can be recognized as such on
virtually any scheme of morality. The aims of the preservation of
international security and the protection of persons against serious and
widespread violations of human rights are already recognized in Article
One of the Charter of the United Nations, which lays out the purposes of
the United Nations.16 In addition, there are aims of equally great moral
importance that must be pursued by the international system. First, it must
pursue the avoidance of global environmental catastrophe. Second, it
must pursue the alleviation of severe global poverty. Third, it must establish

15. I have tried to lay out a theory of how to make democracy compatible with the
need for expertise and specialization in the modern state in THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE
RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 165–201 (1996) and
in Thomas Christiano, Rational Deliberation Among Citizens and Experts, in DELIBERATIVE
SYSTEMS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT THE LARGE SCALE 27, 47–48 (John Parkinson &
Jane Mansbridge eds., 2012). Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravscik
have argued that significant independence of international institutions from states can be
compatible with democracy in Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy Enhancing Multilateralism,
63 INT’L ORG. 1, 1–31 (2009).
16. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–4.
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a decent system of international trade. At the very least, meeting these
challenges will require significant cooperation from many of the world’s
states. Consequently, there are moral duties on the part of states, and the
people who are members, to attempt to achieve effective cooperation with
other states in pursuing these mandatory aims.
The morally mandatory aims do not exhaust the moral requirements on
people in the world. What they do is specify certain aims that it makes
sense to require the international community to pursue, given its current
capacities. Even these aims are hard to achieve and it is very uncertain
how they are to be achieved. But we do know that all states have signed
on to these aims.17 Moreover, these aims make sense from the standpoint
of any moral theory that takes the promotion, protection and respect for
the fundamental interests of persons to be essential to a well-ordered political
system. For a cosmopolitan theory, these aims must be regarded as provisional
in the light of the limited capacities of the international system. The long
run aims must involve the universal realization of distributive justice and
basic freedoms. But these are far beyond anything the system is capable
of pursuing now. Hence, this political view might be called a progressive
cosmopolitanism.
The morally mandatory character of the aims and the necessity of general
cooperation in the pursuit of the aims imply that there are certain tasks
that are morally mandatory for states to participate in.18 This suggests a
set of moral imperatives that are not the usual context for voluntary
association. The usual context of voluntary association is that the parties
are morally at liberty whether to join, and even if some associations do
pursue morally important aims, there are enough of them that one may
choose among them without moral cost. But the need for large-scale
cooperation to pursue morally mandatory aims is what makes the
international system a peculiar kind of political system. It relies on consent,
but cooperation is required to pursue morally mandatory aims.

17. For evidence of this universal acceptance of these aims, see U.N. Charter art.
56; G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000), http://
www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7RR-RWV7] (aiming
to reduce extreme poverty); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 17–39; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 11, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [https://perma.cc/38CX-NR4K]; Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 10, 1522
U.N.T.S. 29, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003f7f7 [https://
perma.cc/96QE-TBDV] (aiming to reduce ozone-depleting substances); General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
18. Christiano, supra note 1, at 388.
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So what is the role for state consent? Consent as a necessary condition
on certain kinds of obligation usually implies that there is a kind of moral
liberty to refuse consent and thereby refuse the particular obligation at
issue. This is protected by a moral immunity to be free of obligations. I
have argued that there are certain mandatory aims that must be pursued
by means of cooperation. So what moral liberty can there be? There is
significant room for the moral liberty that state consent protects in
international society but it must be heavily bound by constraints. The
justification for the state consent requirement, and thus some moral liberty
to say no, is grounded in the fact that though we are morally required to
cooperate in solving these fundamental moral problems, there is a great
deal of uncertainty as to how these problems can be solved. Though there
is general agreement among scientists that the earth is warming due to
human activity, there is disagreement as to how much and how quickly
this is happening.19 There is also substantial disagreement about how to
mitigate global warming and what a fair and efficient distribution of costs
might be.20 The same uncertainties attend thinking about how to alleviate
global poverty and how to protect persons from widespread human rights
abuses. And though there is a fair amount of consensus that a great deal
of free trade is essential to a decent system of international trade, there is
significant disagreement about the limits of free trade and the methods for
opening up trade as well as how to deal with the relationship between
uneven development and trade.
This kind of uncertainty, together with the centrality of states in making
power accountable to persons, provides a reason for supporting a system
of state consent with freedom to enter and exit arrangements because it
supports a system, which allows for a significant amount of experimentation
in how to solve the problems. Experimentation within different regional
associations as well as within competing global arrangements may be the
best way to try to solve many of the problems we are facing. And
democratic states are the ideal agents for this kind of experimentation
because of their high degrees of accountability and transparency.21

19. Id. at 389.
20. Id.
21. Id. For a discussion of how uncertainty plays a role in motivating and perhaps
justifying fragmentation of regimes attempting to deal with global problems, see Robert
O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 9, 12, 15
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t., Discussion Paper No. 10-33, 2010), http://belfercenter.
ksg.harvard.edu/files/Keohane_Victor_Final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/APD9-4T9T].
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But the system of state consent must be heavily bounded given the morally
mandatory need for cooperation. In the usual case of treaties, refusal of
entry and exit are permissible and require no explanation.22 In the cases
of treaties that attempt to realize a system of cooperation that is necessary
to the pursuit of morally mandatory aims, the refusal to enter or exit from
it would require an acceptable explanation that lays out the reasons for
thinking that the treaty would not contribute to solving the problem and
that some alternative might be superior.23 Exit or withdrawal is permissible,
but only with an adequate explanation. By “adequate explanation,” I
mean an explanation that is not irrational, unscrupulous or morally selfdefeating and that displays a good faith effort to solve the problem at hand.
The explanation must be in terms of the morally mandatory aims or in
terms of a crushing or severely unfair cost of cooperation. The explanation
need only be adequate not in the sense that it need be the correct explanation,
but it must fall within the scope of what reasonable people can disagree
on. An irrational explanation goes against the vast majority of scientific
opinion. An unscrupulous explanation free rides on others’ contributions
to morally mandatory aims or it refuses to shoulder any share in a morally
mandatory pursuit. A morally self-defeating explanation is one that insists
on a different coordination solution, defeating a coordination solution that
in the circumstance advances everyone’s aims.
The justification for these constraints on state consent derive from the
need for cooperation on morally mandatory aims together with the need
for fairness in the pursuit of these aims. Both these considerations are
central to determining the legitimacy of a process of creating international
law.
Let me situate this claim within the larger framework of international
law. The system already recognizes that states’ agreements are null and
void when they consent to something that is in violation of jus cogens
norms.24 These pose significant limits to state consent. Furthermore,
there are some treaties that are very hard if not impossible to exit, such as
the treaty founding the United Nations. In addition, some treaties are ones
that states can get out of only if they have very good reason, such as the
nuclear nonproliferation treaties. It seems to me that there is a natural
progression from these propositions to one that denies states the right to
refuse consent to agreements that pursue morally mandatory goals on the

22. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1598, 1644 (2005).
23. Christiano, supra note 1, at 389.
24. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 344, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I
18232-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HXH-EWMP].
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basis of the above problematic reasons, especially in the light of the ever
deepening cooperation in the international system.
These boundaries of consent pose genuine limits on the sovereignty of
states. They authorize other states to come together to pressure, and in
some cases even coerce, unscrupulous or irrational states to cooperate in
pursuit of mandatory aims. Again, we see how the international system is
a peculiar kind of political system in that states can be authorized to force
or pressure other states to cooperate or to provide a reasonable explanation
for non-cooperation. These are legitimate and rightful exercises of power
on the part of states when in pursuit of morally mandatory aims.25
VI. FAIRNESS AND STATE CONSENT
I have outlined a conception of the political system of international
society and a view about what makes international decisions legitimate.
When states consent to arrangements, they are bound except if that
consent is to a treaty that violates a jus cogens norm. When states refuse
to consent to an arrangement for the pursuit of mandatory aims, they have
no good reason for it, and they do not specify a reasonable alternative, the
other states have permission to insist on their cooperation and pressure
them. To satisfy the democratic and cosmopolitan concerns, the states
must be highly representative states and the arrangement must be arrived
at in a fair way. The problem I am most interested in addressing in this
paper is what the notion of fairness consists in and in particular, what a
fair process consists in.
VII. FAIRNESS AND MAJORITARIANISM
My interest here is in developing a conception of a fair consensual
process, for reasons I have suggested, but I will add some important reasons
by considering an alternative conception of fair collective decision-making.
A natural thought here is that a fair process of decision-making among
states would be a majoritarian one. But this majoritarian idea can take
different forms. One can imagine a majoritarianism of states such as is
exemplified in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Here, the
rule might be one state, one vote. There are two problems with this approach
that I think attend many of the majoritarian approaches to international
rule making. The first problem is that states are of very different size and
25.

For further elaboration of these ideas, see generally id.
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so a majoritarian rule would not conform to the more fundamental principle
that we want power apportioned to individuals in a way that treats
individuals as equals.
The second problem is that a majoritarian rule of this sort violates in
some way the political and legal integrity of political societies. Let me
explain what I mean here. Despite the arbitrariness of the origins and
boundaries of these societies, many of the political societies within these
initially arbitrary borders have developed highly integrated legal systems
with integrated economic and social arrangements, as well as systems of
accountability for transforming and adjusting these arrangements. States
have arisen to establish justice and protect the basic needs of persons
within limited areas. Within those limited areas states have developed legal
systems, civil society, elaborate bureaucratic apparatuses for administering
justice, educational systems, systems of redistribution of wealth and income
and systems that make these institutions accountable to those are subjected to
them. These institutions have developed over a number of centuries and
have been moderately successful in establishing justice and prosperity for
large numbers of people. Though borders arose more or less arbitrarily,
they now separate fairly well defined units and help define the spheres in
which those units operate. States have some interest in protecting the
borders and the integrity of the systems operating within those borders to
the extent that such protection is necessary for them to carry out their core
responsibilities.26
From an international perspective, the way to think about this situation
is that it is a kind of division of labor in which the world is divided into
units that are capable of establishing justice in each unit.27 What this
means is that, aside from the states that pursue justice and the common
good for their societies, there is no other entity that is presently, and for
the medium-term future, capable of carrying out the tasks states carry out.
On a cosmopolitan view, justice ultimately must relate all persons in a
single framework, but it would be extraordinarily premature to suggest
that we should wish away the state as it is currently constituted in order to
achieve cosmopolitan justice.
I think we must hope and press for more cosmopolitan political institutions
in the long term, within which states will become less powerful federal
26. To be clear, I think that this idea is compatible with a great deal more openness
to migration than contemporary developed states permit. In addition, the mandatory aim
of alleviating severe global poverty, I think, argues strongly for much greater openness to
migration. I make this argument in detail in Thomas Christiano, Democracy, Migration
and International Institutions, in NOMOS: MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION (forthcoming
2015).
27. See Robert E. Goodin, What Is So Special About My Fellow Countrymen?, 98
ETHICS 663, 681 (1988).
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units. But for the time being this is what we have. If cosmopolitan political
institutions are to arise, they will probably and hopefully arise through the
activities of states acting to create them because that will ensure that the
process of creating those institutions will be somewhat accountable to
those who will be subject to them.
For the time being, the thought is, a system of state majoritarianism
threatens the political integrity of political societies by threatening to
impose alien and unworkable legal requirements on these societies that
are inconsistent with their legal and political traditions. This is not meant
to be a nationalist or even a contractarian argument for respecting the
integrity of political societies. It is meant to be a cosmopolitan argument
in the sense that it relies on the thought that the world’s best bet for
realizing justice among persons remains, and will remain for a significant
period, with states. But this can only be secure in the case that the integrity
of political societies is respected. Disruption of the legal and political
traditions of current political societies cannot be justified on the basis of
democracy on the global scale because the latter is still a far off possibility.
We would be replacing an admittedly imperfect arrangement dependent
on a division of labor that does not work in all places with an arrangement
that will not work at all.
Disruption of the integrity of political societies would not only undermine
those societies and their efforts to fulfill their core responsibilities, it
would also undermine the long-term realization of justice in the world.
The reason for this is that the long-term realization of justice in the world
as a whole will depend essentially on democratic states creating cosmopolitan
institutions slowly but surely. However, these states will not create those
institutions if their political integrity and their capacities to fulfill their
core responsibilities are threatened or so I would hypothesize. The creation
of international trade in the post war era was dependent on the creation of
a strong welfare state at home in the case of both the United States and
Europe. A state that could not take care of its citizens would have a hard
time convincing them to join organizations that might further erode the
capacity of their state to carry out its core responsibilities.28

28. This is the historic package of embedded liberalism achieved by the New Deal
in the United States and by the European Community in the second half of the twentieth
century. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 392–98
(1982).
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For these reasons, state majoritarianism cannot be the way to create a
fair decision process for international society. I think similar considerations
undermine the achievement of other more transnational forms of
majoritarianism. For instance, imagine a majoritarian system across societies
such as China and Vietnam as they engage in treaty making. Suppose we
allow the choice to be that of the majority of the group composed of
Chinese and Vietnamese. But here, though the principle in favor of
apportioning power across persons equally might be satisfied, the political
integrity of Vietnam would be very much threatened. We could, of course,
try to diminish this effect by normalizing the votes of China and Vietnam
so that the peoples have equal power in the aggregate. This would undermine
the equal apportionment of power to persons and it would not do a great
deal for the political integrity of these different countries. All it would do
would be to threaten the integrity of China’s political system.
VIII. FAIRNESS AND CONSENT
The consensual method better respects the political integrity of political
societies because it requires the political society as a whole to negotiate
and consent to international arrangements. They can then figure out how
to integrate the new international commitments with their domestic
commitments. At the same time, because the consensual method is bounded
in the way I described above by the requirement to cooperate in pursuit of
the morally mandatory aims, it is the basis of a genuinely political system.
But we do not have a clear idea of how to think about fair negotiation in
this kind of case.
To be sure, a state’s consent to a treaty must not be coerced by the other
party and must not be the consequence of fraud by the other party. These
requirements are stated clearly in the Vienna Convention.29 And of course,
states cannot validly create obligations that violate the jus cogens norms.30
However, I think we have reason to accept stronger norms for the
evaluation of agreements. The avoidance of force and fraud are compatible
with the most appalling unfair advantage taking. Free and fair agreements
require stronger background conditions than merely the absence of force
and fraud. The general idea that stronger background conditions are required
is recognized quite generally in the legal systems of the West. The doctrine
of unconscionable contract is an example in common law systems and
requirements of fairness are built into civil law traditions of contract as
well.
29. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, supra note 24, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 331, 344.
30. Id. at 344.
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IX. FAIRNESS IN INDIVIDUAL TRANSACTIONS
If we think about negotiation and agreement making, we can think of
the purpose of the agreement at two levels. The immediate object of the
agreement is an arrangement of rights—understood broadly to include
liberties, claims, powers and immunities—and duties among those who
make the agreement. The participants can set up a system of rules of
interaction, which establish a complex of rights and duties and to which
they are committed. Alternatively, they can merely exchange rights and
the associated duties to particular things. The further purpose of the
agreement is the production of benefits and burdens among the parties.
The parties shape the social world they live in in terms of basic rights and
duties and they alter it to bring about benefits and burdens that the social
world can achieve. We can think abstractly about the benefits minus the
burdens as the surplus the agreement brings about above the level of
benefits the status quo realizes. The transaction takes place in the context
of a prior set of conditions, which might be thought of as conditions of the
process of transaction. Among these are the absence of force and fraud
and other background conditions that enable the participants to treat each
other as equals.
I have defended in other work a conception of fairness in individual
exchange.31 The view attempts to avoid the classical natural law approach
of equal exchange in value and attempts, rather, to develop a procedural
conception of fair exchange that goes beyond the standards of absence of
coercion and fraud. The reason for the procedural approach is that the
benefits of transactions can be quite heterogeneous and hard to compare
outside the points of view of each of the participants. Therefore, it may
be very unclear in many circumstances whether the goods exchanged are
equal in value in some more objective sense.32

31. See, e.g., Thomas Christiano, Equality, Fairness, and Agreements, 44 J. SOC.
PHIL. 370 (2013).
32. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 80, 88 (Lesley Brown ed.,
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press paperback ed. 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (demonstrating
the classical version of equality in exchange). See also THOMAS AQUINAS, 11 THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA 379–700 (Daniel J. Sullivan ed., Fathers of the English Dominican Province
transs., Encyclopædia Britannica 1952) (c. 1265 C.E.) (displaying the medieval version).
Marx may also be committed to this ideal of equality in exchange. See 1 KARL MARX,
CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Books 1976)
(1867). Alan Wertheimer is the contemporary defender of a version of this view. See
ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 207–46 (1996).
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I argue that if we take an individual exchange as if there were only one
exchange for each person’s whole life, then the appropriate background
fairness conditions for such an exchange consist in the realization of equal
capacities for that exchange. This breaks down into two components:
equal access to cognitive conditions relevant to one’s interests and concerns,
and equal opportunity for exiting or refusing entry into the arrangement.33
When we extend the principle to the usual case in which each person engages
in a series of many exchanges, the persons must have equal capacities
globally in the sense that they start from background conditions that ensure
equal capacities for all. This equal background condition need not be fully
maintained throughout the series because earlier agreements persons have
entered into may curtail opportunities they might have in later agreement
making. If this is done knowingly, the later agreement making in which
there may be some inequality of opportunity is not unfair. Furthermore,
individuals may choose to focus on some agreements in which they think
of themselves as having much at stake and focus less on other exchanges
in which they think of themselves having a lot less at stake. This stake
sensitivity in agreement making will have some importance later.
I have argued that this realizes a kind of democratic value in everyday
life because the two conditions in the one shot case, in effect, specify
circumstances in which persons have an equal say in the structuring of
their relations with each other.34 They specify a kind of condition of global
equal bargaining power between parties such that each person has an equal
say in the formation of the content of the agreements they enter into.35 The
global principle of equal capacity gives persons a kind of equal say in the
formation of their social lives together with others.36 This will not imply
equal bargaining power in each agreement-making context, but only in
some sense over the total amount of agreements, a person enters into.
This principle of equal capacity is meant to give persons equal power
in the process of the creation of the informal social world they live in.
This is partly justified because their interests are, roughly speaking, equally
at stake in the system of agreement making overall. This is also somewhat
like the idea of equality in democratic collective decision-making in which
persons are to have equal power because we think that, for the most part,
their interests are equally in play in the political system. We achieve this
condition of equal power by making sure that people have the resources

33. See Christiano, supra note 31, at 385.
34. See generally id. (arguing that the ideal of fairness gives persons “an equal say
in the formation of this world analogous to the equal say that is afforded in the democratic
account of collective decision making”).
35. See id.
36. See id.
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that enable them to exit or refuse transactions and enter others that advance
their interests. Education, basic needs provision, and other goods give
people opportunities to choose among transactions by enhancing their
bargaining power.
Here, I want to introduce terminology that will be of some importance
as we go on. The stakes a person has in an agreement or set of agreements
consists of the range of potential legitimate interest affecting outcomes of
that agreement.37 This will include the effect on interests if there is no
agreement and the effects on interests of the various agreements available
in the circumstances. We must distinguish between different ways of
conceiving of the stakes a person has in a transaction or in a system of
transactions. On the one hand, there are what I will call the ex ante stakes
a person has in a transaction or system of transactions. This is just the
extent to which the transaction or the system can advance the legitimate
interests of each party independent of the distribution of resources among
the parties. This will vary according to context in the sense that it depends
on the real possibilities of the system or the transaction. On the other hand,
there are the actual stakes in a particular transaction. This will depend on
the interests in the transaction as well as the distribution of resources
among the parties, which will determine what each party brings to the
transactions. In the context of a particular transaction, a person with very
few resources will have higher actual stakes in the agreement because she
has fewer resources to fall back on or to offer others in alternative transactions.
The transaction matters all the more. A person with many resources has
less need for the particular transaction and so has a lesser stake.
The principle of equal capacity is based on the idea that persons have
equal ex ante stakes in a system of transactions. It then requires that the
distribution of resources be adjusted to achieve equal capacity. This is a
special case of the more general principle that persons ought to have
capacities that are proportionate to their ex ante stakes. Someone who has
a lot less stake in a transaction ought to have less power over it than the
one who has more stake.38

37. See Thomas Christiano, Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 131 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas
eds., 2010).
38. There is a worry here, pointed out by Robert Nozick, that this gives people power
over the intimate choices of others. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
172 (1974). I think we should allay this worry with the idea that some interests are protected
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One of the most fundamental puzzles in a system of free transactions is
that this principle of power proportionate to stakes can easily be violated.
For example, if you have two persons who depend on making an agreement
to advance certain interests, the one who has the least stake will often have
more power. This is because they can more easily afford no agreement.
But this means that power is often inversely proportioned to stakes in a
scheme of free transactions, while the normative principle tells us that power
ought to be proportioned to stakes. This is the fundamental puzzle that
Marx pointed to in the relations between capital and labor.39 The laborer
has a great deal at stake in a transaction because her life depends on it, while
the capitalist has a lot less at stake. The consequence is that the capitalist has
more bargaining power and can deprive the laborer of all but the basic
means of existence.40
A scheme of equal opportunity attempts to avoid this in the following
way. It attempts to rectify the kinds of resource differences that produce
this kind of actual inequality of stake in order to equalize capacity to
apportion capacity to ex ante stakes. Now, in a particular transaction, if
two parties have roughly equal capacity overall and one party has more at
stake actually than another because of difference of interest, the usual
consequence is that the one with less at stake will devote less attention to
the issue, in order to devote more time to other issues, while the one with
more at stake will devote more time. In this way, the overall proportion
between capacity and interest is maintained. What Marx was concerned
with was that the capitalists, who have less actual stake in each particular
transaction with a particular worker, also have much more resources to
devote to the making of the transaction.41 This compounds the initial
disproportion. We will see later how this problem occurs in the case of the
transactions among states in the creation of a regime of international trade.
This is a conception of fairness as a background condition for agreement
making. Another idea is the notion of unfair advantage taking. A person
takes unfair advantage of another, I have argued, when she benefits from
an interaction with another as a result of that other person doing things
and by violating a duty to that other person.42 The key is getting another to
do something for you by violating a duty you have to them. What is added

interests in the sense that a person may choose to fulfill these interests without the leave
of others. This might be the case, for example, in choices of friends or life partners.
39. See 1 MARX, supra note 32, at 451.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Thomas Christiano, What Is Wrongful Exploitation?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES
IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 250 (David Sobel et al. eds., 2015).
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here is the idea that one enters a transaction with another person wherein
one has a prior duty to that other.
The two notions of fairness are partially independent of each other. One
can interact with another in such a way that one does not take unfair
advantage of that person even under very unfair circumstances that
disfavor that other person. One does this as long as one acts in accordance
with one’s duty to that other. This duty may require that one do something
to ameliorate that other person’s unfairly unfavorable circumstance, but it
may not require that one undo the unfairness altogether—because one is
not duty bound to rectify all unfairness. One can take unfair advantage of
a person’s situation even if there is no background unfairness generated
by society, as in the case of taking advantage of the person in danger of
drowning in a pool who one can save at little cost.
These two ideas help us understand the obligation generating character
of consent in that significant defects in an exploitative person’s action can
diminish the weight of the obligation of the other party to comply with the
agreement. A highly exploitative agreement such as the requirement to
pay a very high price for being saved from drowning by someone who can
do it for little generates little by way of obligation to comply. In the law,
highly exploitative contracts are often unenforceable and this registers some
of the conviction that these agreements do not generate serious obligations.43
X. FAIRNESS AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
These two ideas of unfair background conditions and unfair advantage
taking are the starting points of reflection on the problem of international
negotiation. They are usually invoked when observers complain of
unfairness in the creation of the WTO. But as we will see, they are not
easy to apply to the case of negotiation between states.
There are four key differences directly relevant to fairness between states
and persons that complicate the application of the above ideas of fairness
to interstate transactions. First, states come with different size populations;
second, states have very different levels of wealth for which the present
generation cannot be held responsible—usually; third, these conditions
occur against a background in which there are no higher order political
institutions with the capacity to rectify serious differences of opportunity
and information; fourth, the negotiations that create a regime of international

43.

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAWM COMM’N 1977).
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trade are morally deeply fraught issues or at least more so than most ordinary
negotiations. Two important structural differences also mark the transactions
among states. They involve more complex strategic games than ordinary
individual exchange. They are what Robert Putnam describes as two level
games: there is the strategic interaction among states and there is strategic
interaction within states and both of these determine the outcome of
international negotiation.44 Second, there are a small number of states so
the interactions among states never replicate the conditions of competitive
markets, which sometimes play a large role in equalizing bargaining power
among individual persons.
Let us start with the morally fraught character of interstate negotiation.
The development of an international regime of trade is deeply morally
fraught because it implicates morally mandatory aims.45 The regime is,
in effect, an attempt to create a kind of new legally structured society
among persons across the world. It is created by states and it imposes
duties on states to lower tariffs or to open up trade in other respects as well as
to establish a partial system of enforceable property rights across the world.
The official purpose of all this is to increase economic growth for the
whole world and in part to increase growth for poor countries.46 The most
important moral concern that animates a concern for international trade is
the possibility that international trade, when properly arranged, can play
a large role in reducing world poverty. This aim can be advanced by the right
system of trade, but problematic features of a trade regime can also threaten
it. The most frequently mentioned issue in this context is the intellectual
property regime established with the WTO.47 It can potentially put life
saving medicines out of reach for poor people in poor countries. Trade in
agriculture also poses a large problem in that advanced economies continue
to protect their agricultural sectors through subsidies, which appear to
undermine the ability of poor countries to trade in the areas in which they
have a comparative advantage.48 Free trade in other areas such as services

44. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 435–36 (1988).
45. See Amrita Narlikar et al., Introduction to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1, 3–4 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012).
46. See the opening clauses of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, that show a concern for growth,
in particular the growth of developing countries, and a concern for environmental issues.
47. See id. at 157 (creating the “Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights,” or “TRIPS,” to oversee the functioning of the Agreement on TRIPS and
to establish “rules of procedure”).
48. See Tim Josling, New Trade Issues in Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 45, at 655.
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and industrial products may damage the capacities of poor countries to
develop their own domestic industries.
I only want here to register some of the prominent issues that a trade
regime faces. I do not want to take a stand on them here. The important
thing for these reflections is that there are important moral issues at stake
in deciding on a trade regime. Moreover, there are disagreements on all
of these issues. For example, there are disagreements on the question of
the importance of protecting infant industries in developing societies,49 on
the significance of agricultural subsidies,50 on the effects of the patent
regime.51 Many of these disagreements focus on how to help developing
societies solve their problems of severe poverty while others focus on what
is a fair system of property rights.
These disagreements are about morally important goods that are
recognized throughout the international system as major concerns. The
disagreements also seem to be allied with differing interests. These are
what establish the political character of the system and what distinguish
the system from a simple system of voluntary association. This is not a
context in which the parties can be solely concerned about advancing their
interests even though their interests have a legitimate role to play in
defining the regime.
Related to this is the fact that the fundamental moral issues that states
must attempt to solve in the international trading system are not ones that
are resolved by some higher order political entity. This contrasts with
much of life in ordinary political systems in which there is some rough
division of labor between the activities one engages in as a private person
and the activities of the state, which are of concern to citizens. We allow
individuals to pursue their own well-being and that of those around them
without too much thought given to others because we think that as citizens
they can attempt to advance the common good and justice for all. Hence,
the activities that people engage in in ordinary economic and other private
associations can be to some significant degree engaged in without concern

49. See Andrew G. Brown & Robert M. Stern, Fairness in the WTO Trading
System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 45,
at 677, 695.
50. See Helen Coskeran et al., Trade in Manufactures and Agricultural Products:
The Dangerous Link?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
supra note 45, at 343.
51. See Keith E. Maskus, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 45, at 411.
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for the wider society. By contrast, when states engage in treaty making
regarding international trade, or at least the basic framework, they do not
have such a background and so the state parties to agreements must be
concerned with advancing the common good and justice in their voluntary
arrangements, given the important effects these arrangements have.
Therefore, even though we are looking to develop a conception of a fair
process of negotiation on international trade, the issues in dispute are not
the ordinary ones involved in the usual cases of fair exchange, which are
normally focused on the interests of the parties. The issues under negotiation
in international trade disputes concern not only interests but also morally
significant disagreements. Thus, the outcomes may not turn out to be the
standard outcomes of ordinary exchange where we expect some kind of
equality in exchange because of fair dealing. The outcomes of negotiation
on international trade should reflect a decided tilt towards the interests of
the worst off in the world. The interests of the poor should be advanced
more significantly from a reasonable system of international trade. Indeed,
we do see some lip service given to this concern in the principle that trade
preferences ought to be accorded to poor countries. Obviously, there is a
lot of ambivalence about this in actual trade negotiations, but it is clear
that people generally accept the principle that the development needs of
the poor ought to have priority over those of others.
The two other problems have to do with the very structure of the idea
of fair negotiation. The conception of fair agreement making I sketched
earlier applies to individuals, but fair agreement making in the international
system applies to states that represent populations of very different sizes.
This poses problems for the account of fairness that I have given. From a
cosmopolitan point of view, it does not make sense to insist that groups
with radically different sized populations ought to have the same power.
It would seem to make sense to think that a society with a much larger
population ought to receive a greater share of the total surplus that results
from an agreement and in some sense they ought to have more power over
the agreement.52
In contrast, it may make some sense to suggest that the informational
resources that give access to information relevant to the advancement of
interests and other concerns might be equalized between states. Although
even here, larger populations may exhibit greater heterogeneity in interests

52. This poses problems for applying standard bargaining theory solutions to the
issues of state negotiation (at least for normative purposes). The standard approaches of
the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and the Rubenstein solution all
require symmetry among the bargainers, which is violated by populations of different sizes.
See Sebastian Zimmeck, A Game-Theoretic Model for Reasonable Royalty Calculation,
22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 357, 361–75 (2012) (discussing each of these three approaches).
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and concerns and so more information may be needed for them to advance
their interests.
The other difficulty is that the size of an economy is usually a very good
determiner of the bargaining power of a society in economic negotiations.
Wealthy and large societies have large internal markets so they often depend
less on trade with others than do smaller, poorer societies. Furthermore,
they have more to offer and so usually have more options than poor societies.
Hence, they have a greater ability to threaten exit from an arrangement
than poorer societies. When large economies such as the United States and
Europe decide to cooperate on bargaining, such as happened in the Uruguay
Round that produced the WTO and the TRIPS and GATS agreements,
they can sometimes be close to irresistible even when they are only a
fraction of the total population.53
The two structural conditions of interstate negotiation have different
impacts on this phenomenon. On the one hand, the fact that there are a
small number of states implies that the bargaining power of the wealthy
is enhanced since there are not a lot of other wealthy states to go to. On
the other hand, the two-level game feature of interstate negotiation tends
to lessen the bargaining power of the wealthy. This is because the elites
of a poor society do not experience the same desperation as the poorer
members. It is also because elites can always use the strong preferences
of their members to solidify their bargaining stances.
If we think purely in terms of the outcome of the agreements, we can
think in terms of the amount of surplus that arises from an agreement and
of the distribution of the elements of the surplus. Here the picture is complex.
The surplus of a negotiated trade agreement partly is going to be the aggregate
of the surpluses of the various trades that are enabled as a consequence of
the trade agreement minus whatever losses there might be due to displacement
of persons in each economic system. Another part of the surplus may arise
from a superior system of rules for enforcing trade agreements already in
place, which in turn may enable more trades that were not previously
enabled.

53. See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS,
LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 11 (2006).
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XI. BARGAINING IN THE FORMATION OF THE WTO
The formation of the WTO included a renewal of the various elements
of the GATT that had been negotiated over the previous forty-seven years,
a new system of enforcement, an intellectual property agreement, a general
agreement on trade in services, and some agreement on developed countries
limiting the agricultural subsidies to their farmers.54
Many have complained that although the intellectual property and the
services agreements have proven to be quite strong, the agreement to limit
agricultural subsidies has proven to be quite weak and there has been little
progress in improving the problem of agricultural subsidies. 55 Thus,
developed countries, whose comparative advantage lies in services and
intellectual property gained a great deal while developing countries, whose
comparative advantage lies in agriculture, did not fare so well. Furthermore,
the Doha development round, which was intended to deal in significant
part with the agricultural subsidies, has not made much progress.56 The
difficulty seems to continue to be that the developed countries cannot
come to an agreement on how to limit their agricultural subsidies.57 The
consequence of this is said to be that developing country exports in
agricultural goods has not increased nearly as much as had been hoped,
though there is variation in this. For example Mexico, which participates
in the WTO and in NAFTA, has not seen much growth in its economy or
in its agricultural exports.58
Richard Steinberg, a prominent analyst of the GATT and WTO negotiating
process, has observed bluntly:
Studies have shown high variance in the net trade-weighted concessions given
and received: some territories, such as the United States, received deeper concessions
than they gave; other territories, such as India, South Korea, and Thailand, gave
much deeper concessions than they received. Moreover, several computable general
equilibrium models have shown that the Uruguay Round results disproportionately
benefit developed country GDPs compared to developing countries, and that some
developing countries would actually suffer a net GDP loss from the Uruguay
Round—at least in the short run. More broadly, it is hard to argue that developing
countries uniformly enjoyed net domestic political benefits from the nontariff
agreements: they assumed new obligations in the TRIPs and TRIMs agreements,

54. See Narlikar et al., supra note 45, at 7.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 2 (“Their most visible symptom can be found in the deadlocks that
have marred the negotiations of its Doha Development Agenda . . . .”).
57. See Jennifer Clapp, WTO Agriculture Negotiations and the Global South, in
THE WTO AFTER HONG KONG: PROGRESS IN, AND PROSPECTS FOR, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA 37 (Donna Lee & Rorden Wilkinson eds., 2007).
58. See Nathaniel Parish Flannery, More Bad News for Mexico’s Economy, FORBES
(July 30, 2015, 9:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2015/07/30/
more-bad-news-for-mexicos-economy [https://perma.cc/MB78-3UC5].
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the GATS, and the Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the GATT
1994—which most long opposed; they gained nothing of significance from the
revised subsidies and anti-dumping agreements . . . .59

How is such an outcome possible when the GATT operated by consensus
decision-making that affords each country equal veto power? The usual
explanation is quite simple and is a straightforward implication of the
massively greater bargaining power of the United States and Europe in the
early 1990s. The basic strategy was called the Single Undertaking.60 The
United States and the EC, realizing that developing countries were not going
to sign on to the intellectual property agreement, the trade in services
agreement, and the weak versions of agreements on agricultural subsidies,
essentially threatened a kind of exit from the whole of the GATT, thus
threatening the developing countries with the gains that had been made
from the previous forty years of agreements.61 The basic strategy was to
exit the GATT 1947, with all the agreements that had been made since then,
and reconstitute it as the GATT 1994 along with the intellectual property,
services, and weak subsidies agreements and the WTO. 62 This left the
developing countries with the choice of either losing all the agreements
that had been made or accepting those agreements with the new elements
that they did not want. They decided that they would be better off with the
new package than with nothing and so they accepted it.63 Developing countries
did benefit, but the lion’s share of the benefits went to the developed
countries.64
The United States and Europe were able to threaten exit because of the
huge size of their markets. They combined to create half of the world’s
GDP in 1994, though they were not even close to half the world’s or the
GATT member countries’ total population.65 The outside option for them
was considerably more attractive—especially when cooperating with each

59. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 366 (2002).
60. See id. at 360 (providing a basic description of the “single undertaking approach
to closing the round”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 359–60.
65. For the size of the US and EC economies, which combined were about fifty percent
of the world’s GDP in 1994, see CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK
533–38 (1995).
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other—than to the developing countries. Therefore, they managed to bargain
for a disproportionate share of the benefits.66
XII. FAIRNESS
When we reflect that much of international economic agreements are
the result of the consent of states and we want to determine the principle
by which power is to be allocated in the process of treaty making, there
are a number of considerations to be taken into account. Here, I am partly
following intuitions developed in the case of the democratic institutions’
domestic societies.
First, simplifying initially as if there were only one issue to negotiate
for all time, it makes some sense for bargaining power to be allocated in
proportion to population. This seems like a reasonable analog of the case
of one person, one vote that one sees in democratic institutions. This suggests
that although the underlying principle is a democratic principle, negotiation
among states must not imply equal power as some have suggested.67 This
is because states have different stakes in negotiation and one measure of
these different stakes is size of population. Equal power among the state
parties would violate the underlying democratic rationale.
Second, we need to think about how bargaining power ought to be
apportioned relative to wealth. This question is not straightforward. The
initial judgment is that power ought not to be apportioned to wealth. This
seems a straightforward analog to thinking in democratic societies. The
reason for this principle in domestic democratic institutions is that the ex
ante stakes persons have in the ruling of a modern democratic society does
not depend on the level of wealth of persons. Given the pervasiveness of
the activities of modern states, all the fundamental interests of all persons
are, broadly speaking, implicated in the decisions of a democratic society.
Here the expression, “the poorest he . . . has a life to live, [just] as the greatest
he”68 seems to be the determining consideration. When we consider the
whole package of issues that a democratic state deals with, then the
fundamental interests of all citizens are roughly equally implicated. Hence,
the principle of oligarchy or apportioning power to wealth has been decisively
rejected in modern societies as a matter of principle if not in practice.

66.
67.

See Steinberg, supra note 59, at 360.
See Mark E. Warren & Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Negotiation, in NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 86, 101 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013), for the
articulation of an equal power view of fair negotiation.
68. Extract from the Debates at the General Council of the Army, Putney, CONST.
SOC’Y (Oct. 29, 1647), http://www.constitution.org/lev/eng_lev_08.htm [https://perma.cc/
P9XW-ZSPC].
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But one might think that this judgment does not extend so easily to
collective decisions about international trade since the trade regime does
not exert as pervasive an impact on the lives of all people as the modern
state does on its citizens. We might be tempted to think that the stakes
people have in international trade negotiations should be measured more
in terms of the amount of wealth that is at stake for each person in the
negotiation since other issues relevant to the person’s welfare can be dealt
with in other ways. That is, one might think that an international trade
agreement is a bit more like a joint investment decision. In joint investment
decisions, other things being equal, we apportion power and benefits partly
in proportion to the relative shares of the investors and the relative stakes
of the parties such as labor.69
But this would be too quick as well. Here we need to recall that though
a particular society may not have as much wealth at stake in a particular
trade negotiation, the wealth that is at stake may be of much greater
significance to it than is a similar amount of wealth to a wealthier society.
In the case of a poor society, an increase in wealth of a certain amount
may mean the difference between that society being able to afford to give
a primary education to its citizens or not. More generally, the welfare impact
of a small amount of trade openness of a poor society may be much greater
than the welfare impact of such a similar opening of a wealthy society.
To be sure, if we take two societies of roughly equal population and
wealth that are such that one is very much dependent on a certain amount
of trade while the other is not, we might think it reasonable for the first to
have more of a say in determining the conditions of trade than the second.
This would accord with the general principle of apportioning power to
stakes.70
The above reflections on poor societies and the greater dependence of
their welfares on smaller amounts of trade can be supplemented with the
thought that, as I argued above, it is one of the mandatory aims of the
international political system to try to find ways of alleviating severe
global poverty. Poverty is looked at as one of the key categories of issues
that the system should be concerned with. The way stakes are measured
in the international system should be in terms of basic generic interests.
To the extent that poverty is singled out as of special concern to the system,

69. See the definition of joint venture in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
70. See Harry Brighouse & Marc Fleurbaey, Democracy and Proportionality, 18 J.
POL. PHIL. 137, 138–41 (2010), for an articulation of this general principle.
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the interest in alleviating poverty should clearly be among the generic
interests that are given heightened concern. This may enhance from
a political point of view our conception of the ex ante stakes the poorer
society has in the negotiation.
One consideration that may sometimes tell against the idea that wealth
ought not to influence the apportionment of bargaining power is that some
societies may be responsible for their low levels of wealth. By this, I mean
that within a generation a particular society may be responsible for its
situation because of unwise economic policies that were knowingly taken.
I do not think that this consideration applies across generations since it is
not reasonable to make later generations responsible for the poor behavior
of earlier generations. However, this could apply in some instances within
a single generation. In that case, the responsibility of the society for its
own prior choices would be similar to the responsibility of an individual
for her own prior choices. The limitation of subsequent opportunities would
then not be unfair. So also, the diminution of bargaining power might not
be unfair either. To be sure, this would require that the society was somehow
behaving collectively badly and that a very wide group of persons could
be said to have a share in the responsibility for the problems. Usually this
would require that the society be democratic.
The principle of ideal justice here is that power be apportioned to the ex
ante stakes of societies in the relevant area of collective decision. Power
ought to be apportioned in accord with population, other things being
equal. It ought not to be apportioned in accord with wealth per se. Indeed,
in some circumstances, because of the great wealth and population of a
society, a society may have a sufficiently large internal market and
consequently less dependence on international trade than other societies,
at least if we are thinking on a per capita basis.71 This may imply that the
power it has based on population ought to be discounted by its lesser average
integration with the world economy.
This brings us back, I think, to the central puzzle concerning the
normative implications of voluntary agreement. The puzzle can be stated
in terms of a basic opposition between two propositions. The first normative
proposition is that, other things being equal, power ought to be apportioned
in accordance with ex ante stakes—where we are thinking in terms of
legitimate and unprotected interests.72 Those who have a greater stake in
a decision or whose interests are much more at stake in a decision, ought
to have greater power in shaping the decision. The second, empirical,
proposition, however, is that in voluntary agreement making those who

71.
72.
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have less actual stake in an agreement have more bargaining power with
respect to that decision to the extent that the two parties must come to an
agreement together.73 This is because they can afford to hold out or they
can better afford non-cooperation than those who have much more at stake
in the agreement. Hence, those who have less actual stake have more
power in a scheme of voluntary exchange. This seems to be the inverse of
what ought to be and yet seems also to be a basic feature of voluntary
agreement.
Recall that often the imbalance created by lesser stakes is partially or
maybe completely rectified by the fact that the party with lesser stakes
also puts a lot less resources into the process of negotiation because it
matters less to them. This can happen when we have negotiation among
equals. If I do not care much between two options or even between the two
options and no agreement, I will let you decide when we have to decide.
I have better things to do with my time and I may recognize the stakes
principle.
But what we see in many cases of agreement making in the international
system is that the party that has less at stake also has a lot more resources.74
In this case, they may care less or have less reason to care but they have a
lot more resources with which to pursue what they care about. In that
case, the better off may have much more power than the worse off and
more power than the person with much more stake in the agreement. It is
in this context that we may see a problem above. This seems to be the
situation between wealthy developed societies and developing societies.
Developed countries come to the multilateral conferences with armies of
experts in the law, economics, and politics of trade while poorer countries
often cannot afford more than one representative, if even that.75 Hence,
the power imbalance is extraordinary.
A further principle that is important in this context is a principle for
defensible inequalities in the apportionment of power. This too is inspired
by the example of democratic theory and by a more general principle of
equality. We may think that in some cases, some greater inequality than
is justified by differences in stakes can be justified if this is necessary for
the international community as a whole to make decisions efficiently and
expeditiously. This is a kind of parallel with the desirability of representative

73.
74.
75.

See Christiano, supra note 37, at 136.
See BARTON ET AL., supra note 53, at 11.
See Steinberg, supra note 59, at 365.
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democracy over direct democracy even from an egalitarian standpoint.
The idea is that if an inequality helps bring about a greater capacity to
make good decisions for the whole of the international community, this
may be justified.76
XIII. POWER APPORTIONMENT PRINCIPLES AND RULES
The above remarks give us some indication as to a set of power
apportionment principles for fair international negotiation. They are merely
a start in trying to apply cosmopolitan and democratic principles to the
process of international negotiation. They are also an attempt to give an
interpretation of the problem of legitimacy that many have pointed to in
the formation of international regimes of international trade.
The principles help us get some grip on what it takes for international
negotiation to be fair. To the extent that fairness is an element in grounding
the legitimacy of these international institutions that are so formed, violation
of the principles to one degree or another may diminish the legitimacy of
the international institution.
There is one necessary step in the account of legitimacy that I have not
yet taken. That step consists in trying to elaborate rules of collective
decision-making that could plausibly implement the principles. The idea
would be to construct institutional mechanisms that tend to counter
balance the effect of differences of wealth, for example, in determining
bargaining power.
There are really two things that we know can rectify, to some extent,
the power imbalance we see in the making of international trade regimes.
The first is that the multilateral conferences that create these agreements
can attempt to disseminate information among the participants. This can
rectify some of the informational incapacity of the poorer countries and
enable them to secure better treaties. This was clearly one problem with the
conference that shaped the WTO. Poorer countries were not fully informed
about the nature of the agreements on agricultural subsidies that were made.
In particular, they did not know how weak they were.77
Nevertheless, this will not solve the problem we saw above. There are
still the major bargaining advantages for wealthy states that are not correlated
with population or stakes more generally. The only way in which this can
76. See generally Thomas Christiano & Will Braynen, Inequality, Injustice and
Levelling Down, 21 RATIO 392 (2008) (arguing that the levelling down objection to the
principle of equality can be conclusively rebutted by the common good conception of the
principle of equality).
77. See Amrita Narlikar, Collective Agency, Systemic Consequences: Bargaining
Coalitions in the WTO, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
supra note 45, at 184, 187.
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be, and has been, partially rectified in the international system is through
the creation of strong coalitions among developing countries. Indeed, this
was part of the problem in the formation of the WTO. Developed countries
were able to peel off individual developing countries one at a time by
means of small side payments because the coalitions that were formed
were not as strong as they could have been.78 They have gotten stronger
since then and this is one of the reasons we see deadlock and not worse
outcomes in the Doha round.
To be sure, the coalitions of developing countries, even with all their
population advantages, have not been sufficient to set up many changes
in the direction of developing country interests. They have helped soften
the effect of the TRIPs agreement.79 But, for the most part, the Doha round
has been a disappointment. Furthermore, though developing countries are
generally represented in coalitions, many states among the least developed
have felt that they were not very well represented by coalitions that consist
mainly of India, China, and Brazil.80 Still, there have been gains from these
coalitions. In significant part, they are due to the large populations that
are represented by these coalitions.
In addition, coalitions economize on information costs and, thus, enhance
the positions of developing countries in terms of the first principal component
of capacity.81
In general, I think we have reason to believe that multilateral treaty
making is going to enhance the capacities of developing countries in shaping
the trade regime. It tends to encourage coalitions, which can bargain more
effectively with developed countries, and it tends to economize on information
costs for developing countries. Furthermore, multilateral conferences can
help make the process of bargaining more transparent, by bringing
international NGOs into the process, thus exposing hard bargaining by
powerful countries.82 Since powerful states have some desire to be seen
as good international partners, this may lessen the intensity of hard bargaining.
It has brought about some improvement in the trade positions of the least
78. See id. at 187.
79. See id. at 194.
80. See id. at 197 (describing concerns expressed by African ministers that in the
Group of Seven, “not one African country was represented in a round that purports to be
about development”).
81. See id. at 185.
82. See Jens Steffek, Awkward Partners: NGOs and Social Movements at the WTO,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 45, at 301,
301.
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developed countries and this seems to be in part because of the more active
roles these countries are playing in the negotiations of the WTO.83
XIV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: LOOSE ENDS
I have attempted to lay out some of the groundwork for elaborating a
principle of fair negotiation among states with regard to the trade regime.
However, the progress has been slow. The basic principle of the need for
power to be apportioned to the ex ante stakes participants have in the
system has been articulated. But the principle of fair negotiation among
states has yielded only very abstract sub-principles such as the thesis that
states with greater population have greater stakes and the thesis that states
with greater wealth do not have greater stakes. I have articulated only very
general rules for international negotiation to realize these principles. Partly,
this is because the principles are not elaborate or precise enough.
Furthermore, the observation that power should be apportioned to ex
ante stakes, however normatively satisfying, comes up against the basic
observation that power is, as a matter of empirical fact, normally inversely
related to actual stakes when an agreement must be made between parties.
This problem can be partly mitigated in domestic societies when they attempt
to change the actual stakes for people by bringing about a regime of equal
opportunity by means of an effort to achieve a certain distribution of
resources. But this idea is not available in the international order, as we
know it. States themselves must realize whatever political institutions there
are. In addition, the international system does not have the capacity to
realize a distribution of resources.
This observation could make us skeptical about the very idea of fair
negotiation in the international system. We may be inclined to think only
of outcomes as a way of evaluating international negotiation. However,
this would be too quick. More work needs to be done in trying to assess
the possibilities for institutional checks on the dynamic that leads power
to be inversely related to stakes. Furthermore, there are also many
uncertainties and disagreements about how to evaluate outcomes as well,
which is one of the main reasons for attempting to construct an account of
fair negotiation.

83. See Shishir Priyadarshi & Taufiqur Rahman, Least-Developed Countries in the
WTO: Growing Voice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
supra note 45, at 275, 295–96.
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